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ABSTRACT. In a controlled laboratory experiment, we
found evidence for our predictions that participants who
received fair distributive treatment were more likely to lie
to give a supervisor a good performance evaluation than
those treated unfairly, and those who received unfair
distributive treatment were more likely to steal money
from a supervisor than those treated fairly. We further
proposed that the presence of an ethical code of conduct
would moderate these relationships such that when the
code was present these relationships would be weaker
than when the code was absent, but we failed to find
support for these moderating effects. Our findings suggest
that the relationship between distributive justice and
unethical behavior is likely more complex than previously
considered. Both researchers and managers may benefit
from a broader understanding of the factors that motivate
and inhibit unethical behaviors intended to benefit and
harm supervisors and/or organizations.
KEY WORDS: codes of conduct, distributive justice,
ethics, fairness, unethical behavior
Incessant news reports draw attention to unethical
acts committed by everyday people including gov-
ernment officials, professional athletes, religious
leaders, educators, parents, and children. Similarly,
corporate America has faced its own ethics crisis in
the last decade, with integrity sometimes left on
the sidelines of organizational decision making
(Schlessinger and Vogel, 1998). Ethical misconduct
has led to the demise of certain organizations (e.g.,
Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and Adelphia), and
countless individuals live with the costs of unethical
behavior within organizations. Dishonesty alone has
been estimated to cost $50 billion annually to the
United States (Bradford, 2002).
Employees may conduct unethical behaviors such
as lying to potentially help their boss and/or orga-
nization. For instance, a survey of over 2,000
executive assistants and secretaries in Canada and the
U.S. found that 32.6% of those questioned disclosed
that they had falsified time sheets, 17% reported
notarizing documents without witnessing the sig-
nature, 10% destroyed or removed damaging infor-
mation, 6.5% wrote documents with misleading or
false information, and 5.1% falsified vouchers or
expense accounts, and all of this unethical activity
was performed in the service of their bosses and/or
organizations (Kleiman, 1996).
In contrast, however, employees also conduct
myriad forms of unethical and/or illegal behaviors to
potentially harm their organizations. For example,
according to the latest National Retail Security
Survey conducted by the University of Florida
(Flandez, 2008), losses from ‘‘shrinkage,’’ which
include theft, fraud, and error, reached approxi-
mately $40.5 billion in 2006. About half of that
– $19 billion – came from employee theft. Fur-
thermore, researchers believe this crime against firms
is responsible for 30–50% of business failures (Bullard
and Resnik, 1993). The alarming phenomenon of
unethical activity is not conducted by merely a few
‘‘bad apples in the barrel.’’ A study conducted by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce suggests that about
75% of employees had stolen from their employers at
least once, and half of them stole at least twice
(McGurn, 1988).
In this study, we draw from a social exchange
perspective (e.g., Blau, 1964) and propose that
treating employees in a fair manner may actually
invite as well as discourage unethical behavior. We
examine the effects of distributive justice, or the
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fairness of outcomes (Adams, 1965), and the
presence of an ethical code of conduct on two dif-
ferent unethical acts: lying for (i.e., to benefit) a
supervisor and stealing from a supervisor. Building on
previous research that demonstrates a negative rela-
tionship between distributive justice and stealing
(e.g., Greenberg, 1990, 1993, 2002), we suggest that
distributive justice is positively related to lying for
one’s supervisor and negatively related to stealing
from one’s supervisor. This is the first empirical
work, to our knowledge, to propose that distributive
justice may be positively related to unethical
behavior. In addition, we examine the interaction
between the priming effect of a code of conduct and
distributive justice. We propose that the effects of
distributive justice on lying for and stealing from a
supervisor will be diminished when a code of con-
duct is present versus when absent.
The remainder of this manuscript will unfold as
follows. First, we review distributive justice and
social exchange theory and articulate how distribu-
tive justice may influence the expression of lying for
and stealing from one’s supervisor. Further, we detail
literature on codes of conduct and describe how the
presence of a code of conduct may interact with
distributive justice to predict these two unethical
acts. Finally, we provide a description of our
experimental research design and study results, and
conclude with a discussion of our study’s implica-
tions.
Distributive justice theory and social
exchange theory
Increasingly, organizational justice researchers examine
three dimensions of fairness (Folger and Cropanzano,
1998): the fairness of outcomes, or distributive justice
(Adams, 1965); the fairness of the procedures by which
those outcomes are determined, or procedural justice
(Folger and Greenberg, 1985; Thibaut and Walker,
1975); and the fairness of interpersonal treatment by
supervisors, or interactional justice (Bies and Moag,
1986). Here, we focus on distributive justice or the
fairness of outcomes received from exchange rela-
tionships such as the outcomes (e.g., allocation of pay,
workload, or benefits) received from a supervisor (e.g.,
Adams, 1965).
A review of the justice literature generally advo-
cates a view that fair treatment leads to positive, and
unfair treatment leads to negative, attitudes and out-
comes for the organization and its members (for a
review see Colquitt et al., 2001). In this study, how-
ever, we suggest that the effects of distributive justice
can be much more complex. Using social exchange
theory as a theoretical lens, we offer a view of dis-
tributive justice in which fair treatment may actually
lead to wrongdoing perpetrated by employees.
Social exchange theory focuses on the relationship
cultivated by the exchange of resources between two
parties (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976). According to this
theory, individuals feel obliged to repay the benefits
they receive from others (e.g., Blau, 1964; Emerson,
1976; Gouldner, 1960). Put succinctly, if one party
provides a benefit, the other party is motivated
to reciprocate by providing a benefit in return
(Gouldner, 1960). While parties can refuse to recip-
rocate benefits received from others (i.e., reciprocat-
ing benefits is voluntary), those who fail to reciprocate
could receive negative consequences such as distrust,
decreased reputation, denial of future benefits, as well
as other sanctions (Gouldner, 1960). In contrast, those
who choose to reciprocate can engage in a self-
perpetuating system of exchange in which benefits,
mutual trust, approval, and respect reside (Blau, 1964).
Particularly relevant to the present work, some
theorists have linked the concept of social exchange to
organizational justice (e.g., Organ, 1988, 1990). From
a justice point of view, fair treatment from a manager
or the organization creates an open-ended and closer
social exchange relationship in which the employee
has the obligation to ‘‘repay’’ the manager or the
organization (Cropanzano et al., 2001). Thus, justice
researchers (e.g., Organ, 1988, 1990) predict, based
on social exchange theory, that employees respond to
fair treatment with organizational citizenship behav-
iors (OCB) (e.g., Organ, 1988, 1990) and increased
performance (Cropanzano et al., 2001).
With respect to distributive justice, employees who
perceive that they receive fair outcomes from their
organization tend to increase their performance (e.g.,
Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg, 1988; Pfeffer and
Langton, 1993) and their expression of OCB (e.g.,
Colquitt et al., 2001). For example, Greenberg (1988)
conducted a field experiment in which employees
were assigned to the offices of higher, equal, or lower
status co-workers while their own offices were being
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refurbished. Greenberg (1988) found that, when
compared to those employees assigned to equal status
offices, employees who were assigned to higher status
offices exhibited higher job performance, whereas
employees who were assigned to lower status offices
exhibited lower job performance.
In contrast to previous literature linking social
exchange and distributive justice, we recognize that
there may be a potential downside to fair distributive
treatment from one’s supervisor. We predict that
employees also may reciprocate high levels of dis-
tributive justice by lying to benefit their supervisors.
Similar to carrying out helpful behaviors such as
OCBs, lying for one’s supervisor seemingly benefits
one’s supervisor by increasing the image or reputa-
tion of the supervisor. Thus, a social exchange per-
spective suggests that lying for one’s supervisor can
‘‘repay’’ fair treatment from a supervisor.
Moreover, and consistent with previous research
(e.g., Greenberg, 2002), we propose that distributive
justice will be negatively related to stealing from the
supervisor such that individuals steal as a form of
retaliation in response to low levels of distributive
justice. This prediction corresponds with previous
research demonstrating that employees are more
likely to steal when they receive unfavorable versus
favorable outcomes (Greenberg, 1990, 1993, 2002).
In sum, we predict that distributive justice may result
in two different reactions, and the nature of our
predictions depends upon whether the unethical act
has the potential to help or harm the supervisor.
Distributive justice may be positively related to lying
to help the supervisor and negatively related to
stealing from the supervisor:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals will be more likely to lie for
their supervisor when they receive high versus
low levels of distributive justice.
Hypothesis 2: Individuals will be less likely to steal
from their supervisor when they receive high
versus low levels of distributive justice.
Codes of conduct and distributive justice
Codes of conduct are used to convey standards and
expectations for ethical behavior, and to communi-
cate core values to those within the organization
(Weaver et al., 1999). These expectations provide
individuals with guidelines for ethical behavior by
explicitly communicating rules and procedures for
performance (McDonald, 2000). Codes of conduct
are frequently used by organizations, and are
increasingly present in organizational policies. For
instance, 98% of the 254 companies that responded
to a survey of the Fortune 1000 reported that their
organizations formally addressed conduct issues or
business ethics within company documents (Weaver
et al., 1999). Organizations choose to develop codes
of conduct because they allow employers the
opportunity to disseminate the organization’s values,
regulate behavior, increase morale, promote a posi-
tive image, and attract employees (Weaver, 1993).
Although ostensibly an effective way to increase the
likelihood of ethical behavior in organizations,
research findings in regard to the usefulness of codes
of conduct are mixed.
Numerous studies note the salutary effects of codes
of conduct on ethical attitudes and behavior. For
example, codes of conduct have been shown to
decrease unethical behavior of employees (McCabe
et al., 1996). Other empirical research highlights the
role of corporate codes and policy for improving
ethical perceptions and standards in organizations
(e.g., Ferrell and Skinner, 1988; Hegarty and Sims,
1979; Laczniak and Inderrieden, 1987; McCabe et al.,
1996; Singhapakdi and Vitell, 1990; Somers, 2001;
Valentine and Johnson, 2005; Weeks and Nantel,
1992; Weller, 1988). Hegarty and Sims (1979) for
instance, argued that formal policies regarding ethical
behavior thwarts unethical behavior independent of
any contingent consequences. Further, McCabe et al.
(1996) proposed that individuals derive meaning and
identity from their social contexts and accept standards
of virtues embedded within codes of conduct that are
consistent with individuals’ role expectations within
the organization.
Although the benefits of codes of conduct are
often readily observable, some researchers have
found no discernible difference in behavior resulting
from the adoption of such codes (Akaah and
Riordan, 1989; Badaracco and Webb, 1995; Callan,
1992; Cleek and Leonard 1998; Mathews, 1987).
Cleek and Leonard (1998) found little support for
the idea that ethical codes of conduct affect ethical
decision-making behavior. Further, Callan (1992)
found that individuals’ knowledge and use of an
ethical code of conduct had little influence on
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employees’ ethical perceptions; codes of conduct
were not significantly related to any dimensions of
employees’ ethical values. This led some to believe
that codes of conduct, despite becoming more
widespread among organizations, can sometimes be
viewed ‘‘as distractions to be skimmed (at best),
‘filed,’ and forgotten’’ (Weaver et al., 1999, p. 541).
That is, codes of conduct may become ignored
within organizations, such that they serve as ‘‘win-
dow dressing’’ or have little to no impact on the
actual ethical performance of employees within
organizations (Trevino, 1990).
We acknowledge that there may be situations
where codes of conduct may be ‘‘filed and forgot-
ten.’’ One reason codes of conduct are sometimes
forgotten is because they are not emphasized within
ethically problematic situations. When codes of
conduct are present during a potential ethically
problematic situation, however, these codes can be
used to cue an ethical response in individuals. That
is, the presence of codes of conduct within a situa-
tion can serve to heighten awareness of the ethical
implications of a situation and may subsequently
mitigate the expression of unethical behavior (Cleek
and Leonard, 1998; Ferrell and Skinner, 1988;
Trevino, 1986; Weller, 1988).
In the present research we examined if the pres-
ence of a code of conduct influences unethical
behavior expressed in response to distributive justice.
We argue that codes of conduct will likely suppress
lying for one’s supervisor in response to high levels
of distributive justice. That is, the positive relation-
ship between distributive justice and lying for one’s
supervisor will be diminished when codes of con-
duct are present versus absent. Similarly, we propose
that the negative relationship between distributive
justice and stealing from one’s supervisor will be
diminished when codes of conduct are present ver-
sus absent. Stated formally, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 3: Codes of conduct will moderate the
relationship between distributive justice and lying
for the supervisor such that the relationship is weaker
when codes of conduct are present versus absent.
Hypothesis 4: Codes of conduct will moderate the
relationship between distributive justice and
stealing from the supervisor such that the rela-




We recruited 126 senior-level undergraduate students
from a management course at a large southern uni-
versity in the U.S. to participate in our study. Sixty-
three percent of the participants were male, 96% were
between 18 and 25 years of age, and 82% were Cau-
casian. Approximately half (52.4%) were employed at
the time of this study. Participants were told that they
would receive extra credit in their management
course for their participation. They were also told that
their participation was voluntary and their responses
would be kept confidential.
Procedure and manipulations
This study was conducted in two phases. In the first
phase, participants completed a questionnaire con-
taining some individual difference variables unre-
lated to the current study and demographic variables.
Approximately 2 weeks later, the same individuals
from phase 1 participated in phase 2 laboratory ses-
sions in which they received our manipulations and
completed the catalog task described below.
A 2 (distributive justice: high or low) 9 2 (code of
conduct: present or absent) factorial design was
conducted to test our hypotheses. In the second
phase of the investigation, participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the four different condi-
tions. Upon entering the behavioral laboratory,
students were welcomed by the experimenter, who
was a graduate student, and given a catalog task.
They were told,
In front of you is a list of 30 items that are present in this
[department store] catalog. Please find the prices for as
many items as possible in the list from the catalog, and
write down those prices in the blank spaces on the
paper. You have 15 minutes to complete this task.
In addition, participants were told that the
amount of extra credit they could receive in their
management class depended on their performance
on the catalog task, and the experimenter was the
person who was going to grade their performance.
They were told that they would receive a maximum
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of 40 extra credit points, but they could receive
fewer points (i.e., 10, 20, or 30), depending on their
performance on the catalog task. Participants were
also informed that besides the extra credit points,
they would be paid money for their participation in
the research study.
After participants worked on the task for
15 minutes, the experimenter stopped them, col-
lected their task materials, and told participants to
remain in the room while the experimenter graded
their performance in another room. The experi-
menter then left the room.
The experimenter came back in a few minutes
with an envelope for each participant. Each enve-
lope contained an index card and 8 one-dollar bills.
Then, participants were told,
Inside this envelope, there is a score card where
you’ll find the amount of extra credit points you will
receive and the amount of money you have earned
for your participation. The money is in the envelope,
but we are understaffed today. I was in a hurry to
prepare them, so hopefully the amount is correct.
Please keep your score card, take the money, and
leave the envelope in the box in the front of the
room.
At this time participants read their score cards,
which contained the distributive justice manipula-
tion. Participants in the high distributive justice
condition (n = 58) received score cards indicating
that they received 40 extra credit points. Participants
in the low distributive justice condition (n = 68)
received the score cards indicating that they received
20 extra credit points.
The score card also included the amount of
money that the participant was to receive. All par-
ticipants were told that they will receive $5 for their
participation.
After distributing the score card, the experimenter
requested participants to write down the number of
extra credit points they received in this study, and
participants were told that this information would be
given to their management professor. Participants in
the code of conduct present condition (n = 49)
received a scantron to record their number of extra
credit points. This scantron contained the code of
conduct for the university printed near the bottom,
above where participants wrote their names. In the
code of conduct absent condition (n = 77), partici-
pants were given a blank index card to record their
extra credit points.
As stated previously, in all conditions participants
received score cards indicating that they earned $5
for their participation. Yet, in each envelope there
were 8 one-dollar bills. Thus participants had a
chance to take $5, $6, $7, or $8. To convince the
participants that the experimenter would not know
how much money participants took, the experi-
menter left the room at this point and waited
approximately 3 min to allow participants to take
the money from the envelope and place the enve-
lope in a box at the front of the room. There were
no discernable identifying marks on participants’
envelopes, and all of the envelopes looked the same.
Therefore, to participants it appeared that the
experimenter would have no way to discern how
much money was taken by each participant.
After waiting 3 min, the experimenter returned
and asked participants to fill out an evaluation form
of his/her performance. Participants were told that
this evaluation sheet was from the Director of
Graduate Studies of the University and this evalua-
tion would be used to assess the experimenter and
determine of his/her graduate scholarship (for similar
approach see Jones and Skarlicki, 2005). A volunteer
was chosen from the participants and was asked to
put all evaluation sheets in a large envelope and take
it to their professor’s office directly after the study.
Again, participants were made to believe that the
experimenter would not be able to find out how
they evaluated him/her. The experimenter left the
room to allow the participants to fill out the evalu-
ation sheet. When the experimenter returned, par-
ticipants were asked to complete a short survey that
contained our manipulation check items. Finally,
they were debriefed and thanked for their partici-
pation. During the debriefing session, all participants
were informed that they would receive 40 extra
credit points for their participation.
Dependent variables
Lying for the supervisor
On the experimenter evaluation sheet described
above, participants were asked to evaluate the
experimenter’s performance by responding to 15
items using a 7-point Likert scale (1-strongly disagree;
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7-strongly agree). There were 7 items corresponding
to behaviors that the experimenter did not perform in
any of the experimental sessions (see the Appendix).
For example, a sample item was ‘‘The experimenter
stayed in the room during the entire study’’; as indi-
cated above, the experimenter left the room three
times during each experimental session. These 7
items, which reflected behaviors that were never
performed by the experimenter, were averaged and
served as our measure of lying for the supervisor
(a = 0.85; Cronbach, 1951).
Stealing from the supervisor
We measured stealing from the supervisor by
counting the amount of money participants took
from the envelope, beyond the $5 they were told
that they should receive. As described in the pro-
cedure, there were 8 one-dollar bills in the envelope,
so participants could have taken an additional $1, $2,
or $3. Although participants were led to believe that
the experimenter could not track how much money
of the $8 was taken, within each envelope there was
a very small number, undetectable to participants,
which corresponded to their seat position in Phase 2.
Therefore, after the study was completed the
experimenter was able to track how much money
each participant took beyond $5 and this variable
ranged from $0 to $3.
Manipulation checks
We included two sets of items to serve as manipulation
checks for the distributive justice manipulation. First,
we included two items as a check that participants
understood the distributive manipulation. These items
were ‘‘I received 40 extra credit points for participating
in this study’’ and ‘‘I received 20 extra credit points for
participating in this study.’’ In addition, we used Col-
quitt’s (2001) 4-item distributive justice measure to
ascertain if our manipulation influenced participants’
distributive justice perceptions. An example item was
‘‘Do your extra credit points reflect the effort you have
put into your work?’’ These 4 distributive justice items
demonstrated acceptable reliability (a = 0.94). Partic-
ipants responded to all manipulation check items by
using a Likert scale (1-strongly disagree; 7-strongly
agree).
The effectiveness of the code of conduct manipu-
lation was assessed using a separate sample of 58
undergraduate students recruited from a management
course in a large southern university in the U.S. The
sample had an average age of 21.26 years old, 58% of
the participants were female, and 86% were White.
The code of conduct was manipulated in the same way
as described in the current study. One item was used as
the manipulation check, which asked participants to
what extent they agreed with the statement that ‘‘The
[University’s] Honor Code was on the bottom of the
gray scantron.’’ Participants answered on a 7-point
Likert scale (1-strongly disagree; 7-strongly agree).
Participants in the code of conduct present condition
agreed more with this statement (M = 3.54,
SD = 2.32) than those in the code of conduct absent
condition (M = 2.22, SD = 1.78); t(53) = 2.35,
p £ 0.05.
Results
We conducted t-tests to determine if our distributive
justice manipulation was successful. For our two-item
distributive justice manipulation check, participants in
the high distributive justice condition agreed more
with the statement that they received 40 extra credit
points (M = 5.31, SD = 2.60) than those in the low
distributive justice condition (M = 1.57, SD = 1.50),
t(124) = 10.05, p £ 0.01, and participants in the low
distributive justice condition agreed more with the
statement that they received 20 extra credit points
(M = 5.49, SD = 2.20) than those in the high dis-
tributive justice condition (M = 1.66, SD = 1.63).
t(124) = 10.96, p £ 0.01. Furthermore, participants
in the high distributive justice condition perceived
their outcomes (i.e., extra credit points) to be fairer
(M = 3.93, SD = 1.00) than those in the low dis-
tributive justice condition (M = 1.69, SD = 0.89);
t(124) = 13.29, p £ 0.01. These results indicate that
our distributive justice manipulation was successful.
Table I reports the means for the two dependent
variables, stealing and lying, by experimental con-
ditions. To test our hypotheses, we conducted a 2
(distributive justice) 9 2 (code of conduct) MA-
NOVA on our dependent variables (see Table II for
results). Consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2, results
showed a main effect of distributive justice on both
stealing and lying, multivariate F (2, 121) = 12.14,
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p £ 0.01; stealing F (1, 122) = 19.78, p £ 0.01;
lying F (1, 122) = 4.86, p £ 0.05. Participants were
more likely to steal (i.e., take extra money) when
distributive justice was low (M = 1.28, SD = 2.01)
than when distributive justice was high (M = 0.21,
SD = 1.40), and participants were more likely to lie
for the experimenter when distributive justice was
high (M = 2.13, SD = 1.33) than when it was low
(M = 1.62, SD = 0.79). Therefore, both hypotheses
1 and 2 were supported.
Although we did not predict a main effect of the
code of conduct, results demonstrated that the
presence of the code of conduct resulted in higher
levels of lying (M = 2.13, SD = 0.16) and stealing
(M = 1.30, SD = 0.25) than when the code of
conduct was absent (lying M = 1.70, SD = 0.13;
stealing M = 0.51, SD = 0.20), multivariate F (2,
121) = 5.54, p £ 0.01; stealing F (1, 122) = 6.36,
p £ 0.05; lying F (1, 122) = 4.72, p £ 0.05.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 predicted the moderating
effects of the code of conduct on the relationship
between distributive justice and lying and stealing.
Results showed that the code of conduct moderated
the relationship between distributive justice and
stealing, but did not significantly moderate the
relationship between distributive justice and lying,
multivariate F (2, 121) = 3.18, p £ 0.05; stealing F
(1, 122) = 6.36, p £ 0.05; lying F (1, 122) = 0.06,
p > 0.10. Figure 1 illustrates the interaction be-
tween distributive justice and the code of conduct
on stealing. As could be seen from the figure and
contrary to Hypothesis 4, the negative effect of
distributive justice on stealing was stronger when the
code of conduct was present rather than absent.
Therefore, we did not find support for Hypotheses 3
and 4 in this study.
Discussion
We examined the influence of distributive justice
and codes of conduct on two different types of
unethical behavior, lying for and stealing from a
supervisor. Based on a social exchange theory per-
spective, we argued that distributive justice would
differentially influence these two types of unethical
behaviors. More specifically, we expected that high
versus low levels of distributive justice would result
in increased lying for the supervisor – the experi-
menter in this experimental context. Further, in line
with existing literature in organizational justice (e.g.,
Colquitt et al., 2001) we predicted that low versus
high levels of distributive justice would result in
increased stealing from a supervisor. Our results
confirmed these predictions, suggesting that the
TABLE II
ANOVA results for both dependent variables
Stealing Lying
df F Partial eta squared F Partial eta squared
Distributive justice (1, 122) 19.78** 0.14 4.86* 0.04
Code of conduct (1, 122) 6.36* 0.05 4.72* 0.04
Code of conduct 9 Distributive justice (1, 122) 6.36* 0.05 0.06 0.01
*p £ 0.05; **p £ 0.01.
TABLE I









Stealing Low Present 2.40 1.23
Absent 0.81 2.09
High Present 0.21 1.84
Absent 0.21 0.77
Lying Low Present 1.89 0.93
Absent 1.50 0.71
High Present 2.37 1.65
Absent 1.89 0.89
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relationship between distributive justice and uneth-
ical behavior is likely more complex than previously
considered in the organizational justice literature.
We are puzzled by our results for the interactive
relationship between codes of conduct and distrib-
utive justice on lying and stealing. We predicted that
the presence versus absence of a code of conduct
would decrease the expression of lying and stealing
in response to distributive justice. We did not find
support for these predictions. Instead, we found that
the presence of a code of conduct had no significant
influence on the relationship between distributive
justice and lying for the supervisor. Although
unexpected, this result is similar to previous research
demonstrating that codes of conduct sometimes have
no discernable impact on unethical behavior within
organizations (Badaracco and Webb, 1995; Cleek
and Leonard, 1998). However, we also found that
the presence of a code of conduct actually increased,
rather than decreased, stealing from the supervisor in
response to low distributive justice. The direction of
this relationship was entirely unexpected and sug-
gests that when individuals are treated unfairly the
presence of codes of conduct can facilitate the
expression of unethical acts to potentially harm the
supervisor and/or help the individual. Instead of
prompting ethical behavior in our study, it is possible
that the code of conduct may have raised expecta-
tions regarding their treatment from the experi-
menter. When the code of conduct was present
participants may have felt more harmed by low
distributive justice and therefore stolen more from
the experimenter.
Further, we were surprised by the unexpected
main effect of the code of conduct manipulation.
The presence versus absence of the code of conduct
increased lying for and stealing from the supervisor.
These main effects and the interactive effect de-
scribed above suggest that codes of conduct might
encourage unethical behavior. Future research
should examine these relationships further to deter-
mine why emphasizing ethical concepts (i.e., using a
code of conduct as an ethical prime) may serve to
enhance unethical behavior.
Theoretical implications
Our study is the first, to our knowledge, to empir-
ically demonstrate that distributive justice is both
positively related to lying for one’s supervisor and
negatively related to stealing from one’s supervisor.
Previous research has examined how distributive
justice is negatively related to unethical acts that have
the potential to harm the supervisor or the organi-
zation, such as sabotage or stealing (e.g., Greenberg,
2002). This previous research indicates that, among
other things, treating employees in a fair manner can
aid in inhibiting stealing within organizations.
Although this previous work has made important
contributions to our understanding of the conse-
quences of fairness, we posited and found that the
nature of the relationship between distributive jus-
tice and unethical behavior depends upon whether
or not the unethical act has the potential to harm or
help the supervisor. Similar to previous work, we
found that distributive justice is negatively related to
unethical behavior intended to harm (e.g., stealing).
However, our result for unethical behavior intended
to help (e.g., lying) showed that distributive jus-
tice can prompt individuals to act unethically in
response to fair treatment. These divergent results
broaden our understanding of the consequences
of organizational justice and suggest distributive
justice can both enhance and inhibit unethical acts.
Future theoretical and empirical work examining the













Figure 1. Graphical representation of the interaction
between distributive justice and code of conduct on
stealing.
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relationship between organizational justice and
unethical behavior should consider whether or not
the unethical act of interest has the potential to harm
or benefit the organization and/or supervisor.
Practical implications
As exemplified by Arthur Andersen, WorldCom,
Tyco, and other business scandals, unethical behaviors
seem ubiquitous in today’s business landscape. Elim-
inating unethical behavior therefore is a challenge
faced by supervisors, organizations, and their con-
stituents. An understanding of the types of factors that
motivate unethical behaviors intended to benefit and
harm supervisors and/or organizations is important in
order to reduce unethical behaviors within organiza-
tions. Although our findings suggest distributive jus-
tice may promote lying for one’s supervisor, we do not
recommend that employers and managers should
hesitate from treating their employees fairly. Indeed,
our results suggest that by attempting to reduce the
expression of lying by treating employees unfairly,
one could increase the expression of unethical
behavior intended to harm the organization (i.e.,
stealing). As mentioned previously, organizations and
leaders reap many benefits from treating their
employees in a fair manner such as increased perfor-
mance and extra-role behaviors. As such, we concur
with previous justice research that it is important to
treat employees fairly. But, managers should be aware
that employees may respond to fair distributive justice
treatment by ‘‘repaying’’ with unethical acts to benefit
the supervisor and/or organization. Future research
should examine conditions in which organizational
leaders can help decrease the effect of this relationship,
such as exploring whether or not these unethical acts
decrease when employees are monitored and sanc-
tioned for unethical acts.
Limitations and future research
Our findings should be viewed in light of the limita-
tions of our study. First, given our use of an artificial
laboratory setting to manipulate and measure the
variables of interest, one might question whether our
findings would generalize outside the lab. We recog-
nize that our study lacks the realities of organizational
politics or pressure, and thus, the generalizability of our
findings is limited. However, given our preliminary
approach to understanding factors that both promote
and inhibit unethical behavior, an experimental design
was warranted to provide a more rigorous and con-
trolled examination of this particular facet of individual
ethical behavior (Griffin and Kacmar, 1991). None-
theless, we recognize the limitations when attempting
to extend relationships found using university student
subjects to non-student populations (Peterson, 2001)
and encourage future research to examine our predic-
tions among an employee population within a field
setting. Second, our code of conduct manipulation
warrants further investigation. We inferred that the
presence of the code would make the ethical implica-
tions of the situation more salient than when the code
was not present. However, we did not measure whe-
ther or not this was the case. Future research should
investigate how codes of conduct influence ethical
decision-making. In particular, we believe that it is
important to know the conditions under which these
codes of conduct have positive, negative, or no dis-
cernable impact on unethical behavior.
Conclusion
An understanding of how distributive justice influ-
ences unethical behaviors that help or harm the
organization and supervisors is important to help
mitigate and eliminate unethical behaviors within
organizations. In our study we found support for the
notion that participants who receive fair treatment are
more likely to lie to help an experimenter than those
treated unfairly, and those treated unfairly were more
likely to steal from an experimenter than those treated
fairly. Our results suggest that fair distributive treat-
ment can both enhance and inhibit unethical acts,
depending upon whether or not the unethical act has
the potential to harm or benefit one’s supervisor. Our
results for the interactive relationships between dis-
tributive justice and codes of conduct on lying for and
stealing from the supervisor suggest that codes of
conduct may enhance or have no influence on the
expression of some types of unethical acts in response
to distributive justice. We hope our study prompts
future research to help organizational leaders and
scholars better understand why and how employees
conduct unethical behaviors within organizations.
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Appendix
Items in the evaluation sheet that were used to form
the dependent variable of lying for the supervisor.
1. ___ The experimenter stayed in the room
during the entire study.
2. ___ The experimenter gave me at least one
example of finding an item in the catalog
before I began the task.
3. ___ The experimenter spoke to me about the
alternative task before beginning the study.
4. ___ The experimenter filled out my name
and student ID number on the scantron be-
fore I entered the room.
5. ___ The experimenter gave me two copies
of the consent form, one for me to keep and
one to return to him/her once signed.
6. ___ The experimenter asked me questions
about my previous shopping experience.
7. ___ The experimenter prepared the exact
amount of money for me.
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